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Article 6
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is necessary to enable the trial judge to schedule the trial of issues in the
sequence most advantageous to economic judicial administration.
In exercising this discretion, however, the judge should be cognizant
that in certain instances a prior determination of the equitable issues will
result in a limitation on the litigants' opportunity fully to try to a jury
every legal issue in dispute. Although such a result does not operate as
a direct denial of a constitutional right, it does violate the spirit of American justice. Therefore, although there is apparently no legal compulsion, the sequence of trial of legal and equitable issues should be determined only after a careful weighing of administrative factors against the
spirit of the right to trial by jury."8 Any other method would not keep
faith with the traditional basic concepts of our democratic society.

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN INDIANA
There was no liability in tort at common law for killing a human
being. This result obtained whether the relief was sought by the estate
of the decedent since actions for personal injury did not survive or by
a husband or parent on a loss of service theory.2 Where, however, death
did not follow immediately upon the injury, a husband or parent could
recover for the services lost during the intervening period of time.' The
58. Cf. Ransom v. Staso Milling Co., 2 F.R.D. 128 (D.C. Vt. 1941) ; Fitzpatrick v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 1 F.R.D. 713 (D.C.N.J. 1941).
1. Hilliker v. Citizens St. R.R., 152 Ind. 86, 52 N.E. 607 (1899). Cases of this
type are illustrative of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona.
2. Jackson v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 140 Ind. 241, 39 N.E. 663 (1895).
The result in this situation is not reached on the ground the action does not survive.
Here the service action arose in the first instance in a third party on a relational tort
theory.
3. Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520, 85 N.E. 1042
(1908), 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E.101 (1912) ; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426 (1882).
At common law and in like situations today, this action can be commenced after the
death of the person from whom the plaintiff was entitled to services or can be commenced before death, as a normal loss of service action, in which case the death of the
injured party prior to judgment does not abate the action but does fix the period of loss.
The service action does not abate on the injured party's death since it never was "his
action" and therefore does not fall within the common law rule that personal torts do not
survive the death of either party. Hilliker v. Citizens St. R.R., 152 Ind. 86, 52 N.E.
607 (1899); Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176, 25 N.E. 192 (1890). Furthermore, the
husband or parent's action does survive their death. See note 26 infra.
It is not clear why in the service actions the death of the injured party, although
not abating the plaintiff's action, should fix the time for which damages can be assessed
and leave post-death losses unrecoverable. The reason most frequently assigned is the
indefiniteness of the damages. However, this justification does not adequately account
for the situations where prospective losses were assessed at common law.

NOTES
injured party could of course sue on the injury but death prior to final
judgment abated the action.4
The injustice of the common law rule which left the deceased's family without a remedy to secure compensation for their financial loss is
patent. The tortfeasor was well advised to kill, instantaneously if possible, rather than maim his victim. The defect was first rectified in 1846
in England with the passage of Lord Campbell's Act.' All American
jurisdictions have modified the common law rule by statute.6
In Indiana two general statutes are available in wrongful death situations. The more important of these is the Wrongful Death Act ' (hereinafter referred to as 2-404), a copy in major respects of the English act.
It provides, in brief, for a cause of action to accrue to the personal representative to be prosecuted for the benefit of certain beneficiaries. The
other statute" (hereinafter referred to as 2-217) extends the common law
4. Central Ind. Ry. v. State Bank of Lapel, 93 Ind. App. 487, 178 N.E. 537 (1931).
In Indiana if the plaintiff dies following a favorable judgment at the trial court, his
claim survives and may be prosecuted by his personal representative in the event an
appeal is taken and a new trial granted. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-405 (Burns 1946). Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. v. McCullom, 183 Ind. 556, 109 N.E. 206 (1915), aff'd, 245 U.S.
632 (1917); Harmon v. Brown, 183 Ind. 535, 109 N.E. 212 (1915).
5. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
6. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 24.1, 24.2 (1956).
7. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (Burns Supp. 1957). The present text of the statute
reads as follows:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the
personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be,
lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. When the death
of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two years, and the damages
shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, and subject to
the provisions of this act, shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower,
as the case may be, and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to
be distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased. If such
decedent depart this life leaving no such widow or widower, or dependent children or
dependent next of kin, surviving her or him, the damages shall inure to the exclusive
benefit of the person or persons furnishing hospitalization or hospital services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, not exceeding one thousand dollars; performing medical or surgical services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, not exceeding one thousand dollars; to the undertaker for the funeral and burial expenses, not exceeding one thousand dollars; and to the personal representative, as such, for the costs and expenses of administering the estate and prosecuting or compromising the action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, not exceeding
one thousand dollars; and in case of a death under such circumstances, and when such
decedent leaves no such widow, widower, or dependent children, or dependent next of
kin, surviving him or her, the measure of damages to be recovered shall be the total of
the reasonable value of such hospitalization or hospital service, medical and surgical
services, such funeral expenses, and such costs and expenses of administration, including attorney fees, not exceeding the total amount of four thousand dollars.
8. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-217 (Burns Supp. 1957). The present text of the statute
reads as follows:
A father, or in case of his death, or desertion of his family, or imprisonment, the
mother, or in case of divorce the person to whom custody of the child was awarded, may
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action of the parent for the loss of services of a child beyond the date of
the child's death to include the period of time until the child would have
attained his majority. Another statute, the Indiana Survival Act,' is also
relevant. Following the common law rule, actions for personal injury
to the decedent do not survive to his estate. Relief in this situation must
be pursued under the provisions of 2-404 or 2-217. However, the survival statute does permit death actions to survive the death of the tortfeasor.'0 Certain specialized statutes, which operate in specific areas or
because of particular relationships, abrogate the traditional defenses to
liability or impose liability without fault in death situations and impinge
on 2-404 and 2-217 in various ways. 1' These statutes are beyond the
scope of this discussion, the emphasis here being on the general death
statutes in Indiana and the problems arising thereunder.
maintain an action for the injury or death of a child; and a guardian may maintain such
action for the injury or death of his ward; in case of death of the person to whom
custody of the child was awarded, a guardian shall be appointed to maintain an action
for the injury or death of his ward. But when the action is brought by the guardian
for an injury to his ward, the damages shall inure to the benefit of his ward.
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-403 (Burns Supp. 1957). The present text of the statute
reads as follows:
All causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the death of
the person entitled or liable to such action, by or against the representative of the deceased party, except actions for personal injuries to the deceased party and for promises
to marry. Any action contemplated in this section or in section 6 of this act may be
brought, or the court, on motion, may allow the action to be continued, by or against
the legal representatives or successors in interest of the deceased. Every such action
shall be deemed to be a continued action, and therefore accrued to such representatives
or successors at the time it would have accrued to the deceased if he had survived. If
any such action is continued against the legal representatives or successors of the defendant, a notice shall be served on him as in the case of an original notice. If any
action has been commenced against the decedent prior to his death, the same shall continue by substituting of his personal representatives as in other actions surviving the
defendant's death; in event the action be brought subsequent to the death of the party
against whom the cause existed, then the same shall be prosecuted as other claims against
said decedent's estate. In any action for personal injuries or wrongful death surviving
because of this section, the damages, if any recovered, shall not exceed the reasonable
medical, hospital or funeral expenses incurred, and a sum not to exceed five thousand
dollars for any and all other loss, if sustained.
10. Before the 1937 amendment the common law rule obtained and therefore the
death action did not survive the tortfeasor's death. Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176, 25
N.E. 192 (1890). However, in allowing the action to survive against the personal representative of the tortfeasor, the legislature placed a limit on the damages recoverable.
The maximum amount is presently fixed at $5000 plus reasonable medical, hospital or
funeral expenses. See note 9 supra; Herrick v. Sayler, 245 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1957).
11. The more important of these statutes are the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952); Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 40-1201 to -1704 (Burns 1952) ; Indiana Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2201 to -2231 (Burns 1952) ; Indiana Employers' Liability Law,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-1101 to -1114 (Burns 1952). The relation of these statutes and
others of lesser importance and the general Indiana death statutes, 2-404 and 2-217, is
treated in SMALL, WORK-MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA §§ 2.3, 2.4, 11.12 (1950
and Supp. 1958).

NOTES
The Basic Distinction of Coverage Between 2-404 and 2-217

At least one early Indiana case' 2 considered 2-217 as a mere appendage of 2-404 which operated in a certain situation, namely the death of a
child, and which permitted the parent rather than the personal representative to bring the action. Had this construction been adopted, the various
requirements and limitations of 2-404 would have been imposed on 2-217.
In short, only one body of wrongful death law would have developed in
Indiana, save for the difference as to the proper plaintiff. In Mayhew v.
Burns" this interpretation was rejected. The court, viewing the two
statutes in the light of the common law situation which they were enacted
to remedy, held that they are entirely distinct and mutually exclusive.
The purpose of 2-217 is to remove the common law barrier to a parent's
recovery for services lost after the child's death. 4 This reasoning accounts for the language commonly found in 2-217 opinions characterizing the action as one to compensate the parent for injury to his "property"
interest-a reference to the common law heritage of the action." On the
other hand, 2-404 creates a new action having no common law parallel.
It grants compensation to certain designated persons who were dependent
and suffered a loss of support from the decedent's death.
In general terms the cases under the two statutes breakdown between
adult deaths, 2-404, and child deaths, 2-217. This distinction, however,
is not based upon age exclusively. The word "child," as it is used in
2-217, refers also to the economic and social relationship of the decedent
and his parents.' 6 If the child has attained sufficient independence from
his parents so that they no longer have a legal right to his services, the
child is classified as emancipated. In such a case an action for the death
would have to be brought as a claim for loss of support under 2-404."r
12. Gann v. Worman, 69 Ind. 458 (1880). See also Cincinnati, H. & D.R.R. v.
Chester, 57 Ind. 297 (1877) ; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513 (1867);
cf. Ohio & M.R.R. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 (1859).
13. 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793 (1885).
14. It should be noted that 2-217 addresses itself only to the relational interest that
a parent has in a child. The interest of a husband in his wife, and a master in a servant,
are not included, and therefore in these cases the common law rule for services after
death still obtains. Indianapolis & M. Rapid Trarisit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520,
85 N.E. 1042 (1908), 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912). See discussion note 3
supra.
15. See, e.g., Graf v. City Transit Co., 220 Ind. 249, 41 N.E.2d 941 (1942) ; Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931) ; Siebeking v. Ford, 148
N.E.2d 194 (Ind. App. 1958); Hahn v. Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956). For
the significance of the "property" label and the incidents that flow from it, see notes
25 and 26 infra and accompanying text.
16. Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793 (1885).
17. In Elwood Electric St. Ry. v. Ross, 26 Ind. App. 258, 58 N.E. 535 (1900) the
father brought an action under 2-217 for the death of his four year old daughter. The
defendant contended that the child had been emancipated by her father since it appeared
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Conversely, if a child has not been emancipated the action is under 2-217
and not 2-404."S
Emancipation is a fact question determined by reference to age, economic independence and, to a somewhat lesser degree, social freedom."
The fact the child continues to live in the family home and to that extent
remains a member of the family unit and under some parental control
does not prevent the child from being considered emancipated."0 This
issue most acutely arises in those cases where a child is wrongfully killed
shortly before attaining the age of twenty-one. In such cases a suit
under 2-217 would necessarily lead to a small recovery since the period
after death during which the parent could claim services is short.2"
Therefore, the action is brought under 2-404 and the defendant contests
the attempted classification of the child as emancipated.22 Only one
Indiana case was found where the determination of the emancipation is23
sue was adverse to the theory under which the plaintiff was proceeding.
This would seem to indicate that juries and the court on appeal are willing
to accept the plaintiff's characterization of the action.
The independence of the two statutes is further indicated by the fact
that the more detailed limitations of 2-404 have not been judicially imposed on actions under 2-217. For example, the monetary limitation
that the child had lived with her grandparents following her mother's death. The court
conceded that emancipation would bar an action under 2-217 but held that the facts did
not show emancipation.
18. Berry v. Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R., 128 Ind. 484, 28 N.E. 182 (1891).
19. Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, 191 Ind. 470, 133 N.E. 588 (1922); Wabash R.R.
v. McDoniels, 183 Ind. 104, 107 N.E. 291 (1914); Berry v. Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R.,
128 Ind. 484, 28 N.E. 182 (1891) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patesel, 118 Ind. App. 233, 76
N.E.2d 595 (1948); Public Service Co. v. Tackett, 113 Ind. App. 307, 47 N.E.2d 851
(1943) ; Standard Forgings Co. v. Holmstrong, 58 Ind. App. 306, 104 N.E. 872 (1914).
20. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patesel, 119 Ind. App. 233, 76 N.E.2d 595 (1948).
21. The Mayhew case laid down the general proposition that the right to services
presumptively terminates and a child is emancipated on atttaining his majority. However, the court indicated that it would be possible, in the proper circumstances, for the
parent-child relationship to continue beyond that age. No Indiana case under 2-217
has so held although Duzan v. Myers, 30 Ind. App. 227, 65 N.E. 1046 (1903) under 2-404
seems inferentially to agree. The usual question is-whether a child under twenty-one
has or has not been emancipated. Consistent with the Mayhew presumption with respect
to the effect of age on the issue of emancipation, it is necessary for the personal representative bringing an action under 2-404 for the death of a person under twenty-one
to allege and submit proof of emancipation. Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, 191 Ind. 470,
133 N.E. 588 (1922).
22. See e.g., Wabash R.R. v. McDoniels, 183 Ind. 104, 107 N.E. 291 (1914) (decedent, 20, held emancipated) ; Berry v. Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R., 128 Ind. 484, 28
N.E. 182 (1891) (decedent, 18, held not emancipated); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Patesel,
118 Ind. App. 233, 76 N.E.2d 595 (1948) (decedent, 16, held emancipated) ; Public Service Co. v. Tackett, 113 Ind. App. 307, 47 N.E.2d 851 (1943) (decedent, 20, held emancipated).
23. Berry v. Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R., 128 Ind. 484, 28 N.E. 182 (1891). This
case was decided on the pleadings.

NOTES
on damages formerly imposed on actions under 2-404"4 was held not
applicable to 2-217 cases. 2 Nor does the two year statute of limitations
of 2-404 reach actions under 2-217. 2
It has been noted that 2-404 and 2-217 differ with respect to the
proper party to maintain the action. In the words of 2-404 "the action
shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent." 2r
Either an executor- or an administrator 29 meets the statutory requirement. There is no need for another party to be appointed. The general
representative handling the other affairs of the decedent should bring the
death action since his duty to the estate in no way conflicts with the
maintenance of the action on the behalf of the statutory beneficiaries."0
In fact it would be improper for a party other than the general representative to maintain the action, although another person can be specially
appointed where the general representative was discharged without prosecuting the claim."
A special appointment also can be made in those
cases where the decedent had no local assets to be administered whether
24.

The historical schedule of damages available under 2-404 is as follows:
1852-1881, $5,000;
1881-1949, $10,000;
1949-1957, $15,000;
1957-to date, no limit.
This schedule does not reflect the damage limitation on the third class of beneficiaries,
i.e. hospital, medical, funeral, and administration cost. The present limitation on these
damages is $4,000, $1,000 per type. See note 7 supra; the third class of beneficiaries was
created in 1933.
25. Hahn v. Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956).
26. Graf v. City Transit Co., 220 Ind. 249, 41 N.E.2d 941 (1942). This distinction,
like the one concerning limitation on damages, has become essentially academic since the
statute of limitations for personal property actions, held applicable by the Graf case
.supra to 2-217, has been reduced to a two year period so that it now coincides with 2-404.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-601, 2-602 (Burns Supp. 1957) ; Merritt v. Economy Dep't Store,
125 Ind. App. 560, 128 N.E.2d 279 (1955).
Other examples are Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440
(1931) (appeal from insufficient damages, cf. Henschen v. New York Cent. R.R., 223
Ind. 393, 60 N.E.2d 738 (1945) (2-404)) and Siebeking v. Ford, 148 N.E.2d 194 (Ind.
App. 1958) (parent's action under 2-217 survives to parent's estate; see also Pennsylvania Co. v. Davis, 4 Ind. App. 51, 29 N.E. 425 (1891); cf. Dillier v. Cleveland, C., C.
& St. L. Ry., 34 Ind. App. 52, 72 N.E. 271 (1904) (2-404)).
27. See note 7 supra. The cause of action is statutory and must be prosecuted in
accord with the procedure of the act creating it. White v. Allman, 122 Ind. App. 208,
103 N.E.2d 901 (1952); Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R. v. Gillard, 34 Ind. App. 339, 71 N.E.
58 (1904).
28. Forrey v. Turpin, 106 Ind. App. 681, 20 N.E.2d 212 (1939).
29. Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Charman, 161 Ind. 95, 67 N.E. 923 (1903).
30. Ibid.
31. Pettibone v. Moore, 223 Ind. 232, 59 N.E.2d 114 (1945) ; cf. Chicago, I. & L.
Ry. v. Hemstock, 102 Ind. App. 654, 4 N.E.2d 677 (1936).
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the decedent was a resident32 or a non-resident. 3 Or, as an alternative in
the case of a non-resident, the foreign administrator may bring the
action."4
The proper plaintiff under 2-217 is usually the father. It is he who
is entitled to the services of the child until that right has been relinquished
by emancipation or otherwise.3" If the father no longer has a claim to
the services because of his death, desertion or imprisonment, the mother
may bring the action. 8 In such a case she must allege and prove the
father's disability in order to show the right in herself.3
In the event
neither parent is in a position to bring the action a guardian may sue, but
damages are limited to an amount sufficient to reimburse the ward's
estate for the death expenses.3
Defenses
Both 2-404 and 2-217 impose liability on the basis of fault. With
respect to the determination of fault the death actions are essentially the
same as normal tort cases. 9 However, in addition, the defendant is in
an unusually favorable position since the statutes place the moving party
in the dual role of proceeding on a direct and a derivative or survival
theory. Thus the defendant, aside from contesting the issue of his own
fault, has available defenses arising from the conduct of the plaintiff
and the decedent. Under 2-404 the plaintiff for the purpose of this rule
32. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-417 (Burns 1953); Pettibone v. Moore, 223 Ind. 232, 59
N.E.2d 114 (1945) ; Ex parte Jenkins, 25 Ind. App. 532, 58 N.E.2d 560 (1900) ; Toledo,
St. L. & K.C.R.R. v. Reeves, 8 Ind. App. 667, 35 N.E. 199 (1893).
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-418 (Burns 1953); Hine v. McDonald 133 N.E.2d 77
(Ind. App. 1956).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-753 (Burns 1953); Bradshaw v. Moyers, 152 F. Supp.
249 (S.D. Ind. 1957); Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Pikey, 142 Ind. 304, 40 N.E. 527
(1895) ; Jeffersonville, M. & I.R.R. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48 (1872). Non-resident and
alien beneficiaries may seek relief and have full rights under the statute. Jeffersonville,
M. & I.R.R. v. Hendricks, supra; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Osgood, 36 Ind. App.
34, 73 N.E. 285 (1905).
35. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 21 N.E. 472 (1889).
36. See note 8 supra; Ohio & M.R.R. v. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366 (1859) ; Southern
Ind. Ry. v. Moore, 34 Ind. App. 154, 72 N.E. 479 (1904).
37. Louisville, E. & St. L.R.R. v. Lohges, 6 Ind. App. 288, 33 N.E. 449 (1893).
38. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 21 N.E. 472 (1889).
The guardian cannot receive general damages since there is no claim to the child's services nor does the child's personal action survive.
39. Most of the cases involve common lav or statutory negligence of the defendant
as a basis for establishing his fault. Intentional or criminal conduct is also actionable.
Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105 (1861). No indiana case was found where a death action
was maintained on a warranty theory of liability. A few courts have held that death
actions will not lie on a warranty basis on the theory that the conduct involved is not
wrongful. See 2 HARPER AND JA.NES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.21 (1956).

NOTES
is the party or parties for whom the action is being maintained, not the
personal representative.4"
A derivative rationale is required under 2-404 by the language of
the statute which provides that the personal representative can maintain
the action if the decedent "might have maintained an action had he or
she, as the case may be, lived."'" Consequently, the decedent's contribu4
tory negligence, 4" and a satisfied judgment" or a valid settlement by
the decedent precludes a recovery by the personal representative. The
decedent's conduct is in issue or much the bases as if the action had been
brought under a survival statute. In Hecht v. Ohio & Mississippi Railway Co. the court went so far as to say that "the cause of action is the
same" and the personal representative "stands in the shoes" of the
decedent.4"
Yet a derivative analysis is not applied to every issue arising under
the statute. Damages are awarded on the basis of the loss to the benefi46
ciaries and not on the theory of an action surviving from the decedent.
Moreover, even though the decedent died with his action barred by the
statute of limitations, the personal representative may maintain the death
40. Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Millican, 87 Ind. 87 (1882).
41. See note 7 supra.
42. See e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Quackenbush, 141 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1956);
Chicago & E. Ill. Ry. v. Hedges, 118 Ind. 5, 20 N.E. 530 (1889) ; Evansville & C.R.R. v.
Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120 (1860).
The burden of pleading and proof of the issue of contributory negligence, whether
the case arises under 2-404 or 2-217, is on the defendant. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-305,
2-1025 (Burns 1946).
43. Hecht v. Ohio & M. Ry., 132 Ind. 507, 32 N.E. 302 (1892) ; Golding v. Town
of Knox, 56 Ind. App. 149, 104 N.E. 978 (1914). In both the Hecht and Golding cases
supra, the judgments were satisfied. The Hecht opinion took some care to point this out.
It would seem on principle that an unsatisfied judgment should similarly bar the personal representative. Although unsatisfied, the decedent could not have sued his wrongdoer a second time since his cause of action would have merged with the judgment. His
remedy would have been on the judgment. The "satisfied" qualifier indicates that perhaps a fear of double recovery rather than devotion to a derivative theory accounts for
the result in Hecht.
Although the cases primarily turn on a construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act, this same problem is present in two 2-404 cases where compensation awards
were asserted to bar the personal representative's action against a third party tortfeasor. Compare Schlavick v. Manhattan Brewing Co., 103 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ind.
1952), with Northern Indiana Power Co. v. West, 218 Ind. 321, 32 N.E.2d 713 (1941).
The workmen's compensation bar has been changed by the recent amendments in 1951
and 1955 to section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1213
(Burns Supp. 1957).
If the decedent prior to his death was in the course of prosecuting an action which
had not progressed to judgment and which consequently abated on his death, the pendency
of such action cannot be pleaded to bar a subsequent death action maintained by the
personal representative. Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143 (1876).
44. Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Logermann, 71 Ind, App. 69, 123 N.E. 818 (1919).
45. 132 Ind. 507, 511, 32 N.E. 302, 303 (1892).
46. See e.g., Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.v. Brown, 178 Ind. 11, 95 N.E. 145
(1912).
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action within the two year period of 2-404" Here, as well as with the
damage issue, the statute is characterized as creating a new cause of action with liability running directly from the tortfeasor to the statutory
beneficiaries.
The direct or new cause of action rationale is also used in cases
where the conduct or prior settlement of a beneficiary is involved. In
Lindley v. Sink4" the husband and the defendant were both at fault in an
auto collision in which the wife was killed. The husband's negligence
was not imputed to the wife and therefore, the wife, if she had lived,
would have been able to maintain an action against the defendant. The
defendant resisted the administrator's action on the ground that the negligence of a beneficiary, the husband, barred the action. The court rejected
this contention holding that "the negligence of one beneficiary does not
defeat the rights of the other beneficiaries. '"" Presumably, however, the
negligence of a sole beneficiary" ° or the negligence of the entire group of
beneficiaries would bar the personal representative. 1 The court in
47. N. 0. Nelson Mfg. Corp. v. Dickson, 114 Ind. App. 668, 53 N.E.2d 640 (1944) ;
German American Trust Co. v. Lafayette Box Board and Paper Co., 52 Ind. App. 211,
98 N.E. 874 (1913) ; Wilson v. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co., 48 Ind. App. 150, 95 N.E.
589 (1911). The two year period of 2-404 is measured from the date of death and not
the date of the appointment of the personal representative. Hanna v. Jeffersonville
R.R., 32 Ind. 113 (1869).
The Wilson case supra in an exhaustive opinion studied the problem and its treatment in other jurisdictions, particularly those having Lord Campbell type statutes. The
court concluded that the derivative language of the statute does not require that the
decedent could have maintained the action at the "instant" of his death as the Hecht case
had suggested but is satisfied by inquiring whether there ever was a cause of action in
the decedent and if so whether before death he had extinguished it by some affirmative
act. The mere passage of time which barred the decedent's remedy was not intended to
bar the administrator. To hold otherwise would be to render meaningless the two year
period of 2-404 in all cases where death followed an uncompensated injury by a substantial time.
The other side of the story, however, is not happy. The defendant is now subject
to'suit long after the event in issue. In the Nelson case szpra liability rested on an injury incurred 10 years or more before the suit. A suggested compromise is to have a
somewhat longer limitations period run from the date of injury. See Note, 26 IND. L.J.
428, 433 (1951).
48. 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456 (1940).
49. Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 16, 30 N.E.2d 456, 461 (1940). The problem has
received various solutions in other jurisdictions. If the death action is brought under
a survival type death statute the negligence of the decedent is the only issue. However,
even where the action is under a Lord Campbell's statute the cases are split. The argument the defendant urged in the Lindley case has been accepted in Illinois. Hazel v.
Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392 (1923). The other possibility, i.e. no beneficiary is barred unless all are at fault, has even been adopted. See
generally 2 HARI'a AND JAMEs, THE LAW oF TORTS § 23.8 (1956).
50. This point appears to have been overlooked by defendant's counsel in Chicago
& E.R.R. v. Biddinger, 61 Ind. App. 419, 109 N.E. 953 (1915).
51. Although the facts of no Indiana case with respect to either the negligence or
settlement by all the beneficiaries have been such as to invoke this rule, the conclusion
is inescapeble in the light of the reasoning of the Lindley cas and the beneficiary settle-
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Lindley was not presented with the question of whether the negligence of
one of the beneficiaries should reduce the damages in an amount equal
to the share of the one at fault. A reduction would seem to be necessary
if the issue is properly raised by instructions to the jury to consider in
their assessment of damages only those beneficiaries not at fault or to
assess in gross but reduce by the amount of the negligent beneficiary's
share. 2
The situation is much the same in beneficiary settlement cases. Although the action under 2-404 is vested in the personal repreesntative
and only he can prosecute the action in the courts, it is agreed, despite
some dicta to the contrary, 3 that the beneficiaries may settle directly with
the defendant without the intervention or approval of the personal representative." 4 The formal statutory centralization of the action in the personal representative is a legislative choice motivated by considerations of
convenience and simplicity. It in no way detracts from the substance of
the controversy which is and remains between the beneficiaries and the
tortfeasor. If all the beneficiaries should settle, the personal representative could not maintain an action." However, if one or more beneficiaries have not compromised their claims, an action would lie on their
Notwithstanding the control the beneficiaries can exercise
behalf."
through settlement, the personal representative, as an incident to his
power to sue, may settle the death claim."7 His action is not subject to
the supervision or approval of the beneficiaries or the probate court."
ment cases discussed infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. See also dictum to this
effect in Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bossert, 44 Ind. App. 245, 87 N.E. 158 (1909).
52. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Moore, 152 Ind. 345, 53 N.E. 290 (1899);
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bossert, 44 Ind. App. 245, 87 N.E. 158 (1909).
53. Yelton v. Evansville & I.R.R., 134 Ind. 414, 33 N.E. 629 (1893); Cleveland,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Osgood, 36 Ind. App. 34, 73 N.E. 285 (1905). The language in
the Yelton case supra to the effect that the personal representative cannot settle without
court approval was specifically rejected in Pittsburgh, C., C & St. L. Ry. v. Gipe, 160
Ind. 360, 65 N.E. 1034 (1902). Similarly, the dicta in Yelton and Osgood indicating
that the beneficiaries cannot settle has been discredited by other holdings. See note

54 infra.
54. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hosea, 152 Ind. 412, 53 N.E. 419 (1899);
Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Moore, 152 Ind. 345, 53 N.E. 290 (1899). See also
Pettibone v. Moore, 223 Ind. 232, 59 N.E.2d 114 (1945) ; Fink v. Peden, 214 Ind. 584,
17 N.E.2d 95 (1938).
55. See note 51 supra.
56. See note 54 supra. See also Cowen v. Ray, 108 Fed. 320 (7th Cir. 1901).
57. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gipe, 160 Ind. 360, 65 N.E. 1034 (1902).
58. Ibid. The proceeds resulting from the claim are not available to creditors as
general assets of the estate and therefore court approval as a matter of creditor protection is unnecessary; Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-705 (Burns 1953); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Eviston, 110 Ind. App. 143, 37 N.E.2d 310 (1914). The beneficiaries, unless the
personal representative's settlement is voidable, can look only to the personal representative for relief on a theory of breach of fiduciary obligation.
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With respect to questions of negligence the analysis of 2-404 is
similarly followed under 2-217. It was said in Citizens' St. R.R. v. Stoddard that "when a parent sues for his own benefit to recover damages for
the technical loss of services caused to him by injury [or death] to the
child, the contributory negligence on the part of either the parent or child,
unless the child is exceedingly young, will preclude a recovery by the
parent." 9 As with 2-404, the direct theory which brings the plaintiff
parent's conduct into issue rests on the familiar principle that one should
not benefit from his own fault. The derivative analysis by which the
conduct of the child is considered is not required by the language of 2-217
but is reached through old concepts of imputed negligence prevalent in
"service" actions. 60
In the event of a settlement or judgment by the child prior to death,
the common law origin of 2-217 leads to results different from those
obtaining in like situations under 2-404. At common law an action by one
entitled to the services of an injured party was not barred by a recovery
by that party."' Separate interests and hence separate actions were recognized. Present day "service" actions retain these same principles. The
59. 10 Ind. App. 278, 293, 37 N.E. 723, 728 (1894).
60. See generally 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 23.8 (1956). The
Indiana cases consistently consider the child's conduct as relevant in a suit by the parent
even though in the converse situation, i.e. child as plaintiff, the negligence of the parent
is not imputed to the child, Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Keely, 138 Ind. 60, 37 N.E.
406 (1894), at least unless the child is non sui juris, Lafayette & I.R.R. v. Huffman,
28 Ind. 287 (1867).
Since the conduct of the deceased child is in issue, the standard of care to be imposed upon the child and in the case of young children whether they are sui juris are
important questions. Although there is some disagreement, Indiana courts probably
have not fixed arbitrary age classifications in determining whether a child is chargeable
with negligent conduct. In Holstine v. Director, 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N.E. 303 (1922)
and Baltimore & 0. Southwestern Ry. v. Bradford, 20 Ind. App. 348, 49 N.E. 388 (1898)
two year old children were treated as incapable of negligence. See also Elwood Electric
St. Ry. v. Ross, 26 Ind. App. 258, 58 N.E. 535 (1900). Generally, however, the negligence issue goes to the jury under instructions that the child must exercise care commensurate to one of his age, experience and intelligenc. See e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt
R.R. v. Jones, 220 Ind. 139, 41 N.E.2d 361 (1942); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Miles, 162 Ind. 646, 70 N.E. 985 (1904) ; Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Antrobus, 33 Ind. App.
663, 71 N.E. 971 (1904) ; City of Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N.E. 47 (1901).
The age of the child is also significant in determining the parent's care. It is settled that to leave a small child unattended, even one classified as non sui juris, is not
negligence as a matter of law on the part of the parents. Citizens St. R.R. v. Stoddard,
10 Ind. App. 278, 37 N.E. 723 (1894) ; cf. Holstine v. Director, 77 Ind. App. 582, 134
N.E. 303 (1922). The potential danger of the place where the child is left or sent and
the degree of necessity motivating the parent's conduct are significant factors. Citizens
St. R.R. v. Stoddard, supra; New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Mushrush, 11 Ind. App.
192, 37 N.E. 954 (1894). The conduct of the plaintiff's spouse or third parties to whom
care of the child had been entrusted is also in issue. Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Fleming,
183 Ind. 511, 109 N.E. 753 (1915) ; Elwood Electric St. Ry. v. Ross, supra; Citizens St.
R.R. v. Stoddard, sazpra.
: 61. Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520, 85 N.E.
1042 (1908), 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912).
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injured party has an action for pain and suffering to vindicate the invasion of his interest in his own person; on the other hand the person to
whom the services are owed and who is responsible for the injured party
can sue for services lost and expenses incident to the injury.62 However,
if a parent sues during the life of the child, the child's subsequent death
would not cause another action to arise under 2-217. The statute gives
an "action for the injury or death" of the child, combining in the alternative the old common law action and the statutory extension. 3
Classes of Beneficiaries under 2-204
There are three classes of beneficiaries under 2-404.6" Their composition is as follows:
Class I. The widow or widower and dependent children constitute
this class. The "children" group is apparently not divided on the basis of
the emancipation distinction between 2-404 and 2-217 applicable to cases
of a child's death. " Emancipation and age, however, are relevant with
respect to the sufficiency of proof of loss to a surviving child.66
Class II. This class is composed of the dependent next of kin.
Next of kin are defined in terms of the law of intestate succession, excluding those included in Class L67
Class III. This is the "death creditor" group. It is limited to the
reimbursement of hospital and medical expenses arising from the last illness or injury of the decedent, and funeral expenses and the costs of administration. Class III was first authorized in 1933. Since 1957 when
the $15,000 damage limitation was removed from the first two classes,
this group is the only one with a maximum recovery, the present limit being $1000 per category, $4000 in total.6"
Certain incidents flow from the class system. Perhaps the chief
among these is the rule that the classes are mutually exclusive. The ac62. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931) ; Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520, 85 N.E. 1042 (1908), 51
Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912). The defendant is not subject, at least theoretically,
to double liability since the elements of damages of the two actions do not overlap.
63. See note 8 supra. This result is proper as a second suit would likely lead to a
double recovery to the extent the first action awarded damages for prospective loss. In
addition the situation presented here probably falls within the policy of res judicata
which often leaves uncompensated complications compounding injuries after judgment.
64. See note 7 mtpra.
65. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Reed, 44 Ind. App. 635, 88 N.E. 1080 (1909);
Duzan v. Myers, 30 Ind. App. 227, 65 N.E. 1046 (1903).
66. See note 99 infra.
67. L. T. Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddel, 49 Ind. App. 40, 94 N.E. 411 (1911) ; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Reed, 44 Ind. App. 635, 88 N.E. 1080 (1909) ; cf. McDonald
v. Miner, 218 Ind. 373, 32 N.E.2d 885 (1941).
68. See note 24 supra.
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tion that accrues to the personal representative on the death of the decedent is for the sole benefit of the top class having a member or members qualified to recover, to the exclusion of those below." It is the pecuniary loss to the persons in the highest class that is the measure of
damages and it is among this group that damages are distributed. Thus,
in a case where the decedent's death leaves financially damaged members
of more than one class, the statute does not provide a remedy for all
those fairly entitled to relief. For instance, where a man dies survived by
his wife and his dependent mother, the mother is not entitled to be an
equitable plaintiff to the action of the personal representative nor can
she share the recovery with the wife."' Similarly, where a wife survives
her husband's death but dies before judgment in the death action, the
personal representative's action dies with her in the absence of other
Class I members, i.e. dependent children,"' and the availability of Class
1172 or Class III" beneficiaries is of no consequence. Nor in such a case
can the action continue on the theory that the wife's interest survived to
her estate. 4 In short, the cause of action under 2-404 vests at the time
of the decedent's death in the highest available class; it can be maintained so long as there are any eligible members in that class but it does
not survive to the estate of any member nor can it pass downward to the
next class. However, before the cause of action vests in a class at least
one person within the class must have been pecuniarily damaged by the
decedent's death. Thus, where a woman dies survived by her estranged
husband and her dependent parents and where it appears that the relationship between the decedent and her husband was such that the husband
suffered no pecuniary loss, then the action can be maintained for the
69. Ondrey v. Shellmar Products Corp. 131 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ind. 1955); Shipley v. Daly, 106 Ind. App. 443, 20 N.E.2d 653 (1939) ; Chicago & E.R.R. v. Biddinger,
61 Ind. App. 419, 109 N.E. 953 (1915) ; Leyhan v. Leyhan, 47 Ind. App. 280, 94 N.E. 337
(1911) ; Dillier v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 34 Ind. App. 52, 72 N.E. 271 (1904).
70. Chicago & E.R.R. v. Biddinger, 61 Ind. App. 419, 109 N.E. 953 (1915) ; Leyhan v. Leyhan, 47 Ind. App. 280, 94 N.E. 337 (1911).
71. It is clear the personal representative is merely the nominal plaintiff. No action can be maintained unless eligible beneficiaries are present. State ex rel. Meriwether
v. Walford, 11 Ind. App. 392, 39 N.E. 162 (1894). See also note 91 infra and accompanying text. However, if other members of the class survive the death of a member,
the action can be continued. Pleak v. Cottingham, 94 Ind. App. 365, 178 N.E. 309 (1931).
72. Ondrey v. Shellmar Products Corp., 131 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ind. 1955); Dillier v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 34 Ind. App. 52, 72 N.E. 271 (1904).
73. Ondrey v. Shellmar Products Corp., 131 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ind. 1955) ; Shipley v. Daly, 106 Ind. App. 443, 20 N.E. 2d 653 (1939).
74. The Indiana Survival Act does not save "actions for personal injuries to the
deceased party." IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-403 (Burns Supp. 1957). See also Dillier v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 34 Ind. App. 52, 72 N.E. 271 (1904).
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Class II parents."5 The restrictive operation of the rule is perhaps best
demonstrated by the fact that in no reported Indiana case have the Class
III beneficiaries recovered under the statute.
The rationale in support of the exclusive class rule is complicated.
The wording of 2-404, at least with respect to the first two classes, does
not demand the rule." It appears, however, that the exclusive class system
follows as a necessary corollary to the method of distribution. The
statute directs the personal representative to distribute the fund recovered to those persons for whom the action was maintained "in the
same manner as the personal property of the decedent." 77 This leads to
an anamolous situation. The statute in theory compensates certain survivors for their pecuniary loss."
The jury assesses the damages in
gross.'
The amount awarded supposedly equals the total pecuniary loss
suffered by those survivors whose interests were before the jury. Yet
the fund recovered is distributed by a method having no relation to the
pecuniary loss, the very basis of the right to recover.8"
75. Indianapolis & C. Traction Co. v. Thompson, 81 Ind. App. 498, 134 N.E. 514
(1922). See also Lese v. St. Joseph Valley Bank, 81 Ind. App. 517, 142 N.E. 733
(1924) ; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Reed, 44 Ind. App. 635, 88 N.E. 1080 (1909).
76. See note 7 supra. The word "or" joining Class I and II in the second sentence
of the statute would not seem necessarily to require an exclusive alternative interpretation. The word "exclusive" earlier in the same sentence refers to the exemption of the
award from the claims of the decedent's creditors. The exclusive class system is expressly required in the third sentence which respect to Class III bneficiaries.
77. See note 7 supra. Intestate distribution is according to the terms of IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-201 (Burns 1953). See also Hunt v. Conner, 26 Ind. App. 41, 59 N.E. 50
(1901). If the one wrongfully killed dies testate the proper method of distribution is
questionable. The language of the statute taken literally would seem to indicate a division according to the terms of the will. This, however, could lead to persons sharing
in the award who do not fall within the enumerated statutory beneficiaries. Such a
result would be at cross-purposes with the intent of the statute. In Forrey v. Turpin,
106 Ind. App. 681, 688, 20 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1939) where the decedent died testate the
court, although apparently not addressing itself to this problem, noted that "the damages
recovered inure to the benefit of those named in said statute."
78. Pecuniary loss as the foundation of the beneficiary's rights and problems of
the measure of damages are discussed in some detail at notes 84-133 infra and accompanying text.
79. "The court, or jury, does not apportion the amount recovered among those
entitled to the damages." Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Ray, 36 Ind. App. 430, 436-37, 73
N.E. 942, 944-45 (1905).
80. The court in Hunt v. Conner, 26 Ind. App. 41, 50, 59 N.E. 50, 53 (1901),
when the inconsistency between the assessment of damages and the method of distribution was pressed upon it, remarked: "The mode of distribution of the amount recovered provided by the statute does not determine the measure of damages. That
method saves the sum recovered from becoming a part of the decedent's estate subject
to the claims of creditors, and bestows it all upon the beneficiaries, but the rule for
apportionment of the fund among the beneficiaries is arbitrarily adopted, and is perhaps in general as equitable in its application as are the provisions of the law of distribution from which it is borrowed, in their practical application."
The fund recovered passes to the beneficiaries exclusive of the claims of the decedent's creditors. Lese v. St. Joseph Valley Bank, 81 Ind. App. 517, 142 N.E. 733
(1924) ; Grancik v. Rojcany, 54 Ind. App. 274, 101 N.E. 745 (1913). It is, however,
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Once the practice of distributing the award without reference to
pecuniary loss is accepted, the exclusive class system has practical support. The separation of the first two classes substantially correponds to
the distribution pattern required by the statute. This can best be shown
through an illustration. Suppose a man is wrongfully killed and leaves
surviving a dependent wife and child (Class I) and his dependent brother
(Class II). The personal representative brings an action, naming all
three survivors as entitled to relief, and recovers the sum of five thousand
dollars. A portion of the verdict, assume one thousand dollars, represents the brother's loss. On distribution the wife and child will share the
fund to the exclusion of the brother."' The wife and child receive one
thousand dollars in excess of their legal loss. The exclusive class system avoids this "windfall" since it prohibits the assessment of damages
on interests that will not share in the recovery because of the method of
distribution." The parties excluded from the personal representative's
action against the tortfeasor are not wronged by the exclusive class rule
since they would have received no compensation even if their loss had
been included in the jury's assessment of damages.
A solution lies in a revision of the distribution system. The award
should be shared on the basis of the pecuniary loss suffered by each
statutory survivor as found by the jury. This method would be consistent with the pecuniary loss theory that supports the action in the first
instance. It then would be possible for all interests suffering injury
to be represented in the action. The exclusive class rule would be unnecessary under a pecuniary loss system of distribution."
Damages
The theory of recovery and measure of damages under 2-404 is the
pecuniary loss visited upon the beneficiaries by the death of the decedliable for the costs of its collection.
N.E. 629 (1893).
81.

Yelton v. Evansville & I.R.R., 134 Ind. 414, 33

IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-201 (Burns 1953).

82. Probably in no cases are damages assessed on interests that will not also share
in the distribution of the total sum. Of course even though all parties share they do
so on an arbitrary basis unrelated to their loss. However in some cases interests are

excluded which could share under the descent law. See Chicago & E.R.R. v. Biddinger,
61 Ind. App. 419, 109 N.E. 953 (1915) (childless spouse and parents of decedent
survive).
The method of distribution system does not explain those cases where a higher class
survives the decedent but is extinguished prior to judgment and the next class is never-

theless refused relief. See notes 72 and 73 supra and accompanying text. These cases
must stand on the proposition that the statute makes no provision for divestment and
the succession of the next group and they therefore remain barred.
83. See e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4 (1957) ; Omio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2125.03
(Page 1954) ; TEx. REv. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 4677 (1952).
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ent. s4 The rule is deceivingly simple. It has been noted that "it is not
. . . easy to determine what damages shall be pecuniary. '"" Two rules
necessarily accompany the pecuniary loss measure: damages are not recoverable for the pain and suffering of the decedent ;86 and the survivors
are not compensated for their grief and sorrow." A tenuous line is maintained between the latter rule and the non-wage services performed by the
decedent for the survivors, a line undoubtedly followed with greater particularity in the court room than in the jury room. s"
The class system under 2-404 is relevant to the damage problem
with respect to plead
and proof of loss. The pleading rules are liberal.
A complaint is suffi lent to withstand a demurrer if it alleges that certain beneficiaries s rvive, naming the relationship without necessarily
labeling the survi ois by name, and that they are pecuniarily damaged by
the decedent's death." In the absence of an allegation of damage, loss
may be implied from the relationship of the decedent and the survivors.
The implication of loss probably applies in this situation to Class II as
well as Class I cases.90
In all cases where the pleadings are controverted, proof of the existence of the alleged beneficiaries is required."' As to proof of their
loss, different requirements obtain depending upon the class of benefi84. "The amount of the recovery is not a penalty inflicted by way of punishment
for a wrong done, but is intended to compensate the next of kin or those who were dependent upon the deceased and who had . . . a pecuniary interest in his life." State
ex rel. Meriwether v. Walford, 11 Ind. App. 392, 394, 39 N.E. 162, 163 (1894). See
also Pittsburgh, C., C. & St L. Ry. v. Brown, 178 Ind. 11, 97 N.E. 145 (1912).
85. Board of Commissioners v. Legg, 93 Ind. 523, 529 (1884).
86. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Brown, 178 Ind. 11, 97 N.E. 145 (1912).
This rule has not been particularly troublesome. It is indicative of the non-survivor
theory of the death actions. It is probable, however, that the cricumstances surrounding
the decedent's death which come into the case on the issue of the defendant's fault
often impress the jury and may enhance the amount of the recovery.
87. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Brown, 178 Ind. 11, 97 N.E. 145 (1912);
Commercial Club of Indianapolis v. Hilliker, 20 Ind. App. 239, 50 N.E. 578 (1898).
88. Compare Board of Commissioners v. Legg, 93 Ind. 523 (1884), with American
Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Savings Bank, 216 Ind. 649, 25 N.E.2d 777 (1940),
and Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937).
89. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 19 N.E. 453 (1889) ; Indianapolis, P. & C.R.R. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133 (1864); Smith v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.
Ry., 67 Ind. App. 397, 117 N.E. 534 (1917) ; Salem Bedford Stone Co. v. Hobbs, 11 Ind.
App. 27, 38 N.E. 538 (1894). See also Clore v. Mclntire, 120 Ind. 262, 22 N.E. 128
(1889) (improper allegation of beneficiaries) ; Duzan v. Myers, 30 Ind. App. 227, 65
N.E. 1046 (1903) (beneficiaries can share in the distribution of the damages even
though action not maintained on their behalf).
90. Pennsylvania Co. v. Coyer, 163 Ind. 631, 72 N.E. 875 (1904) (Class II) ; Korrady v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 131 Ind. 261, 29 N.E. 1069 (1891) (Class I). See
also Cleveland, C., C. & St.L. Ry. v. Henry, 170 Ind. 94, 83 N.E. 710 (1908) (Class
II); Chicago & E.R.R. v. Thomas, 155 Ind. 634, 58 N.E. 1040 (1900) (Class I).
91. There is no cause of action in the absence of beneficiaries. Indianapolis, P. &
C.R.R. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133 (1864) ; Chicago & E.R.R. v. LaPorte, 33 Ind. App. 691, 71
N.E. 166 (1904).
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ciaries represented in the action. In Class I cases very general proof is
sufficient."
This normally consists of evidence of the earning power of
the decedent. 93 However, even this information need not be offered in
detail nor is it necessary to show what the beneficiaries actually received
from the decedent. 4 Furthermore, non-wage factors of pecuniary loss
such as household service and family guidance and training are recoverable and often, as in the case of a wife's death, form the primary support for the recovery.99 In these cases the evidence may be little more
than explanatory of the family arrangement and the duties performed
by the deceased member.96 Thus, the jury is considered competent to assess damages based on a very minimal quantum of information. As a
justification for the relaxed proof requirements it is said that although
the action is grounded on a theory of pecuniary loss, the Class I cases
present circumstances where the decedent was legally obligated to support the beneficiaries and that it can be assumed, in the absence of contradictory proof, that past contributions in wages and services were
made and would have continued.
Logically, the value of the decedent's
earnings and services should be reduced by the costs normally incurred
in their production, namely personal living expenses, but even this limitation has not been clearly applied.98
In Class II cases the proof requirements are more demanding. The
various family relationships are not as close as those under Class I" and
92. Culbertson v. Haynes, 127 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
93. Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Lee, 67 Ind. App. 105, 118 N.E. 959
(1918).
94. City of Indianapolis v. Willis, 208 Ind. 607, 194 N.E. 343 (1935) ; Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L.R.R. v. Staats, 83 Ind. App. 680, 149 N.E. 912 (1925); Lake Erie & W.
Ry. v. Sams, 73 Ind. App. 397, 127 N.E. 566 (1920).
95. American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Savings Bank, 216 Ind. 649, 25
N.E.2d 777 (1940) ; Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937) ; Chicago &
E.R.R. v. Biddinger, 61 Ind. App. 419, 109 N.E. 953 (1915).
96. See e.g., Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937).
97. See e.g., Malott v. Shimer, 153 Ind. 35, 54 N.E. 101 (1899) (applying Illinois
law but treating it the same as Indiana in this respect).
98. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Burton, 139 Ind. 357, 37 N.E. 150 (1894);
Ohio & M. Ry. v. Voight, 122 Ind. 288, 23 N.E. 774 (1890) ; cf. Consolidated Stone Co.
v. Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 73 N.E. 695 (1905) ; Heinrich v. Ellis, 113 Ind. App. 478, 48
N.E.2d 96 (1943) ; Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Lee, 67 Ind. App. 105, 118
N.E. 959 (1918). These same authorities seem to indicate a similar confusion in discounting to present value.
99. The following are examples of the more common family relationships in the
Class IIcases.
Parent dies, adult child survives: Novak v. Chicago & Calumet District Transit
Co., 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d 1 (1956) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lutz, 64 Ind.
App. 663, 116 N.E. 429 (1917) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Champe, 55 Ind. App.
243, 102 N.E. 868 (1913). By the language of the statute and for the purposes of the
exclusive class rule this group is within Class I. Duzan v. Myers, 30 Ind. App. 227, 65
N.E. 1046 (1903). See note 66 supra and accompanying text. However, when the issue
is proof of loss, this group seems to be treated as Class II.
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the decedent was not legally obligated to support the beneficiaries."'
There must be proof of past contributions and the reasonable prospect
that they would have continued in the future but for the death.1"' The
relationships involved, although familial, are of such a nature that the
assistance furnished by the decedent was subject to future contingencies."0 2 The emphasis is "not merely upon the pecuniary ability of the
deceased, but upon the anticipations of pecuniary benefit which the surviving next of kin are shown to have had a reasonable ground to indulge."'
Thus, the loss of actual benefits by the beneficiaries and not
the termniation of the decedent's earning power is the controlling point.
The "actual loss" includes non-wage factors."0 4
In short the definition of pecuniary loss varies with the class of
beneficiaries represented in the action. In Class I cases the survivors
receive more by way of damages than they would have received in the
form of support from the decedent. In a sense their recovery includes a
prepayment of their prospective inheritance.0 5
Emancipated child dies, parents and/or brothers and sisters survive: New York
Central R.R. v. Johnson, 234 Ind. 457, 127 N.E.2d 603 (1955); Wabash R.R. v. McDoniels, 183 Ind. 104, 107 N.E. 291 (1914); Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wright, 134
Ind. 509, 34 N.E. 314 (1893) ; Midland Trail Bus Lines, Inc. v. Martin, 100 Ind. App.
206, 194 N.E. 862 (1935); Hines v. Nichols, 76 Ind. App. 445, 130 N.E. 140 (1921) ;
Pennsylvania Co. v. Reesor, 60 Ind. App. 636, 108 N.E. 983 (1915) ; Vincennes Traction
Co. v. Curry, 59 Ind. App. 683, 109 N.E. 62 (1915) ; Standard Forgings Co. v. Holmstrom, 58 Ind. App. 306, 104 N.E. 872 (1914) ; Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Vester, 47 Ind.
App. 141, 93 N.E. 1039 (1911); Commercial Club of Indianapolis v. Hilliker, 20 Ind.
App. 239, 50 N.E. 578 (1898) ; Diebold v. Sharpe, 19 Ind. App. 474, 49 N.E. 837 (1898);
Chicago & E.R.R. v. Branyan, 10 Ind. App. 570, 37 N.E. 190 (1894).
Adult dies, brothers or sisters survive: Henry v. Prendergast, 51 Ind. App. 43, 94
N.E. 1015 (1911); Smith v. Michigan Central R.R., 35 Ind. App. 188, 73 N.E. 928
(1905) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Drumm, 32 Ind. App. 547, 70 N.E. 286 (1903);
Wabash R.R. v. Cregan, 23 Ind. App. 1, 54 N.E. 767 (1899).
100. It is clear, however, that a legal obligation of support is not a prerequisite to
recovery. Dependency in fact is sufficient. Pennsylvania Co. v. Reesor, 60 Ind. App.
636, 108 N.E. 983 (1915). Total dependency is not necessary. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R.
v. Stephenson, 33 Ind. App. 95, 69 N.E. 270 (1903).
101. Pennsylvania Co. v. Clark, 191 Ind. 470, 133 N.E. 588 (1922); Standard
Forgings Co. v. Holmstrom, 58 Ind. App. 306, 104 N.E. 872 (1914).
102. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wright, 134 Ind. 509, 34 N.E. 314 (1893). The
most common example is the disruptive tendency of marriage on the support furnished
by an adult child to his parents.
103. Diebold v. Sharpe, 19 Ind. App. 474, 481, 49 N.E. 837, 839 (1898). See also
Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wright, 134 Ind. 509, 34 N.E. 314 (1893); Cleveland, C.,
C. & St. L Ry. v. Drumm, 32 Ind. App. 547, 70 N.E. 286 (1903).
104. Indiana Mfg. Co. v. Coughlin, 65 Ind. App. 268, 115 N.E. 260 (1917); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lutz, 64 Ind. App. 663, 116 N.E. 429 (1917); Henry v.
Prendergast, 51 Ind. App. 43, 94 N.E. 1015 (1911); Smith v. Michigan Central R.R.,
35 Ind. App. 188, 73 N.E. 928 (1905).
105. This accounts for the "accumulation" language found in a few Class I
opinions. See Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Mugg, 132 Ind. 168, 31 N.E. 564 (1892); Hunt
v. Conner, 26 Ind. App. 41, 59 N.E. 50 (1901).
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Several results flow from the generality of the measure of damage
rule. The first is the dominant position of the jury. Perhaps this is the
reason rather than a result. One opinion noted that "a mist seems to
hang over the cases when a concrete application of a rule of damages is
sought . . . this uncertainty exists because the extent of compensation

is so largely a jury question."' 0 Too detailed instructions suggesting a
computation formula constitute error."' In the absence of improper elements before the jury,"0 ' appellate review of damages is practically nil.
The amount of the recovery is not disturbed unless it is so large or
small.0 9 to indicate that the jury was motivated "by prejudice, passion,
' 110
partiality or corruption.
Secondly, the breadth of the damage formula means that the range
of admissible evidence going to the issue is nearly unlimited. The condition of the decedent's health and his various virtues and vices are relevant.1 1 ' Evidence of the decedent's future prospects can be considered." 2
The age of the decedent" 3 and of the beneficiaries 1 4 is of course significant. Generally evidence concerning the physical or economic condition
106. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 337, 73 N.E. 695, 697 (1905).
107. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 73 N.E. 695 (1905). See also
Valparaiso Lighting Co. v. Tyler, 177 Ind. 278, 96 N.E. 768 (1911).
108. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Ellis, 83 Ind. App. 701, 149 N.E. 909 (1925).
109. The insufficiency of a recovery under 2-404 may be reviewed on appeal.
Henschen v. New York Central R.R., 223 Ind. 393, 60 N.E.2d 738 (1945). See IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 2-2401, 2-2402, 2-2406 (Burns 1946). A similar result obtains under
2-217. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931).
110. This test or some substantially identical variation has been used by Indiana
courts in reviewing the amount of the recovery. See e.g., Henschen v. New York Central R.R., 223 Ind. 393, 60 N.E.2d 738 (1945) ; Lavene v. Friedrichs, 186 Ind. 333, 115
N.E. 324 (1917); Wabash R.R. v. McDoniels, 183 Ind. 104, 107 N.E. 291 (1914). See
also Clevenger v. Kern, 100 Ind. App. 581, 197 N.E. 731 (1935) (2-217). Successful
appellants on this ground have been few and far between. See e.g., Chicago & E. Ill.
R.R. v. Vester, 47 Ind. App. 141, 93 N.E. 1039 (1911); Commercial Club of Indianapolis v. Hilliker, 20 Ind. App. 239, 50 N.E. 578 (1898). See also Elliott v. Kraus, 92
Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 783 (1930) (2-217).
111. Spice v. Astry, 184 Ind. 1, 110 N.E. 201 (1915); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Starks, 174 Ind. 345, 92 N.E. 54 (1910) ; Deer v. Suckow Co., 60 Ind. App. 277,
110 N.E. 700 (1915); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Parish, 28 Ind. App. 189, 62
N.E. 514 (1902); cf. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N.E. 696
(1903) (evidence as to widow's moral character properly excluded).
112. Swanson v. Slagel, 212 Ind. 394, 8 N.E.2d 993 (1937) ; Heinrich v. Ellis, 113
Ind. App. 478, 48 N.E.2d 96 (1943) ; cf. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Vester, 47 Ind. App.
141, 93 N.E. 1039 (1911) ; Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Wernke, 42 Ind. App. 326, 84 N.E.
999 (1908) (2-217).
113. Heinrich v. Ellis, 113 Ind. App. 478, 48 N.E.2d 96 (1943) ; Deer v. Suckow
Co., 60 Ind. App. 277, 110 N.E. 700 (1915) ; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Rogers,
45 Ind. App. 230, 87 N.E. 28 (1909).
114. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Wright, 134 Ind. 509, 34 N.E. 314 (1893);
Hines v. Nichols, 76 Ind. App. 445, 130 N.E. 140 (1921) ; Vincennes Traction Co. v.
Curry, 59 Ind. App. 683, 109 N.E. 62 (1915) ; Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Stephenson, 33
Ind. App. 95, 69 N.E. 270 (1903).
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of the beneficiaries is inadmissable." 5 The elimination of the decedent's
earning power and not the wealth or need of the beneficiaries establishes
the loss. An exception arises in Class II cases where the condition of
the beneficiaries may be significant in determining whether they could
have reasonably expected assistance in the future. 16
Lastly, the generality of the pecuniary loss measure has led to several subsidiary rules. The earning power of the decedent considered in
estimating the loss to the beneficiaries should not include that portion of
the decedent's income attributable to investment return that will continue
despite his death."' The pecuniary loss of the survivors is not reduced
by insurance on the decedent's life from which they benefited."' Also,
the loss status of the beneficiaries arises at the time of the death." 9 The
subsequent circumstances of a survivor, such as the remarriage of a
widow, does not limit the claimable loss.' The insurance and remarriage
results perhaps seem to dilute the pecuniary loss principle but are probably justifiable on the basis that the tortfeasor is not in a position to
claim advantages from the independent acts of the decedent or a survivor.
The removal in 1957 of the statutory ceiling on damages under 2-404..'
will undoubtedly lead to larger verdicts in death cases. 2 If the increase
should become oppressive, it is reasonable to anticipate that the pecuniary
loss measure will of necessity be refined and particularized in future
opinions in order to restrain overly generous juries.'2 3
The general principles of damages obtaining under 2-217 are similar to those just discussed under 2-404. Pecuniary loss is the basis of
115. City of Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520 (1881); Columbia Grocery Co. v.
Schlesinger, 102 Ind. App. 617, 200 N.E. 414 (1936) ; cf. Hunt v. Conner, 26 Ind. App.

41, 59 N.E. 50 (1901).
116. Novak v. Chicago & Calumet District Traction Co. 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d
1 (1956) ; New York Central R.R. v. Johnson, 234 Ind. 457, 127 N.E.2d 603 (1955).
117. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. Ellis, 83 Ind. App. 701, 149 N.E. 909 (1925).
118. Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184 (1873), aff'd, 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
119. Consolidated Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N.E. 696 (1903).
120. Wabash R.R. v. Gretzinger, 182 Ind. 155, 104 N.E. 69 (1914) ; Consolidated
Stone Co. v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N.E. 696 (1903) ; Evansville & O.V. Ry. v. Woolsey, 120 Ind. App. 570, 93 N.E.2d 355 (1950).
121. See notes 7 and 24 slpra.
122. Maximum damages were seldom awarded in the older cases. The few exceptions included, e.g., Swanson v. Slagel, 212 Ind. 394, 8 N.E.2d 993 (1937) ; Lavene v.
Friedrichs, 186 Ind. 333, 115 N.E. 324 (1917); Wabash R.R. v. Gretzinger, 182 Ind.
155, 104 N.E. 69 (1914); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L.R.R. v. Staats, 83 Ind. App. 680,
149 N.E. 912 (1925). However, in several recent cases, under the $15,000 limit, the full
statutory amount was given. Morrow v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ind.
1956) ; Culbertson v. Haynes, 127 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ind. 1955). See also Hahn v.
Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956) (2-217).
123. This is especially likely in Class I cases where the existing law and proof requirements are very general. Review for excessive damages alone would probably
prove an inadequate check, at least under the present scope of such review.
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the recovery.

It has been defined thusly:

"[The plaintiff] is entitled

to recover only for the pecuniary injury he has sustained, and .

.

.

the

proper measure of damages is the value of the child's services from the
time of injury until he would have attained his majority, taken in connection with his prospects in life, less his support and maintenance [plus]
... . the expenses of care and attention to the child, made necessary
by the injury, funeral expenses and medical services.""" Damages are
not recoverable for the pain and suffering of the decedent nor by way of
solatium for the parents.'
As under 2-404, a problem arises with respect to distinguishing the grief and sorrow of the parents, and the actionable non-wage services of the child, often the main basis of recovery.'
General information of the child's age and alertness is sufficient for the
jury to assess the loss, at least in the case of small children for whom
more detailed facts are unavailable." 7 Evidence of the physical and economic condition of the family is considered since it bears on the utilization and hence the pecuniary importance of the child's services to the
family.'28
The major difference between the two death actions with respect to
damages is the inclusion under 2-217 of certain pre-death elements. This
is a reflection of 2-217 as an extension of the common law action. Services lost between injury and death, medical expenses and funeral costs
124. Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252, 254 (1881). See also Jones v. Drewry'
Limited, 149 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793
(1885); Hahn v. Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956).
"Counsel ask us to decide that there is no financial profit in bringing up a child,
and especially in a city. . . . Of this, however, we can not take judicial cognizance.
We suppose there may be a pecuniary profit in rearing a boy to manhood under some
conditions and circumstances." Citizens St. Ry. v. Lowe, 12 Ind. App. 47, 57, 39 N.E.
165, 168 (1894).
125. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931).
126. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010 (1891) ; Hahn
v. Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956) ; Southern Ind. Ry. v. Moore, 34 Ind. App.
154, 72 N.E. 479 (1904).
127. City of Elvood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N.E. 47 (1901) ; New York,
C.& St. L.R.R. v.Mushrush, 11 Ind. App. 192, 37 N.E. 954 (1894). Ifthe defendant
wants the jury to estimate the cost of rearing a child on the basis of more definite information than their common experience, he should introduce such evidence. Lake Erie
& W.R.R. v. Chriss, 57 Ind. App. 145, 105 N.E. 62 (1914).
The jury's determination of damages is rarely successfully impeached on appeal.
The limited appellate review is similar to the practice under 2-404. See e.g., Hahn v.
Moore, 133 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. App. 1956) ; cf. Elliott v. Kraus, 92 Ind. App. 494, 172
N.E. 783 (1930).
128. American Motor Car Co. v. Robbins, 181 Ind. 417, 103 N.E. 641 (1913); City
of Elwood v. Addison, 26 Ind. App. 28, 59 N.E. 47 (1901). In Hahn v. Moore, 133
N.E.2d 900, 906 (Ind. App. 1956), the court said "the conditions of appellee's family
might be such that the services of the child would be of no value to him, or they might
be such as to be very valuable."
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are recoverable. 2" Even if the family cannot show that the loss of the
child's services exceeded in value the cost of his maintenance, the medical
and funeral expenses may be recovered.'
In Class I and II situations under 2-404 the loss of earning power
between date of injury and death, and medical and funeral expenses are
excluded from the measure of damages. 1 This is probably the greatest
defect in the damage rules under the Indiana death acts. These losses,
except for funeral expenses, were incurred prior to death and by the
decedent and not his survivors. Perhaps logically under the present
scheme of 2-404 they are properly excluded. Factually, however, they
are borne in nearly every case by the same persons the legislature has seen
fit to protect in the statute. Two factors often minimize the defect.
Instantaneous death eliminates the problem except for funeral expenses.
Secondly, the jury can be expected to grant an award sufficient to compensate the survivors for the funeral costs.
However, where there is a considerable period of time between the
date of injury and death, loss of income and medical expenses may be
substantial. The jury, even if aware of the situation, could not adequately compensate the family for these losses. The present system permits a recovery for the pre-death and post-death elements but only in the
alternative. If the injured party chooses to recover on his action, a death
action for his beneficiaries is barred. In the absence of a judgment or
settlement by the decedent, the death action can be maintained but the
measure of damages is limited to the post-death loss to the survivors.
Furthermore, the decedent's estate cannot recover for the pre-death losses
since the action does not survive. It is probably wise to bar the death
action after a recovery by the decedent since the defendant would be subjected to a dual recovery to the extent the verdict in the decedent's action
included prospective damages. Moreover, the survivors would often receive excessive compensation when the total of the funds received from
the decedent through descent and the recovery from the defendant in the
death action is considered. Where, however, the decedent did not recover during his lifetime the danger of double recovery is not present and
liability for the pre-death elements should be imposed on the defendant." 2
129. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931) ; Pere
Marquette R.R. v. Chadwick, 65 Ind. App. 95, 115 N.E. 678 (1917).
130. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E. 440 (1931).
131. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Brown, 178 Ind. 11, 95 N.E. 145 (1912).
132. In one situation these pre-death losses might be reached under the present
law. Suppose a wife receives injuries from which she dies several months later. It
would seem the husband could maintain his common law action for loss of services and
expenses incurred between the date of injury and death without forfeiting his status as
a beneficiary to a 2-404 action. Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42
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This could be accomplished either by allowing the decendent's action to
survive to his estate or by including pre-death elements in the measure
of damages of the death action of the beneficiaries. 3 ' In either event
the pain and suffering element of the decedent's action should not be included since it did not have a monetary impact on the survivors.
Ind. App. 520, 85 N.E. 1042 (1908), 52 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912). The converse, in the case of a husband's death, is not possible since Indiana does not apparently
recognize a common law right in a wife for her husband's services. Burk v. Anderson,
232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952) ; Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E.
860 (1933). See Note, 30 1m. L.J. 276 (1955).
133. See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 45.11, 768.01, 768.02 (1955); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
§§ 119, 120, 132. See generally 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 24.6, 25.16
(1956).

